* a user without 2fa trying to join a 2fa org will fail, but user gets an email to enable 2fa
* a user disabling 2fa will be removed from 2fa orgs; user gets an email for each org
* an org enabling 2fa policy will remove users without 2fa; users get an email
Upstream will soon auto-delete trashed items after 30 days, but some people
use the trash as an archive folder, so to avoid unexpected data loss, this
implementation requires the user to explicitly enable auto-deletion.
Adjust checks for max access count, expiration date, and deletion date.
The date checks aren't that important, but the access count check
currently allows one more access than it should.
The org name in the invitation email was made customizable in 8867626, but
the org name is still hardcoded as "bitwarden_rs" in the confirmation email.
Updated several json response models.
Also fixed a few small bugs.
ciphers.rs:
- post_ciphers_create:
* Prevent cipher creation to organization without a collection.
- update_cipher_from_data:
* ~~Fixed removal of user_uuid which prevent user-owned shared-cipher to be not editable anymore when set to read-only.~~
* Cleanup the json_data by removing the `Response` key/values from several objects.
- delete_all:
* Do not delete all Collections during the Purge of an Organization (same as upstream).
cipher.rs:
- Cipher::to_json:
* Updated json response to match upstream.
* Return empty json object if there is no type_data instead of values which should not be set for the type_data.
organizations.rs:
* Added two new endpoints to prevent Javascript errors regarding tax
organization.rs:
- Organization::to_json:
* Updated response model to match upstream
- UserOrganization::to_json:
* Updated response model to match upstream
collection.rs:
- Collection::{to_json, to_json_details}:
* Updated the json response model, and added a detailed version used during the sync
- hide_passwords_for_user:
* Added this function to return if the passwords should be hidden or not for the user at the specific collection (used by `to_json_details`)
Update 1: Some small changes after comments from @jjlin.
Update 2: Fixed vault purge by user to make sure the cipher is not part of an organization.
Resolves #971
Closes #990, Closes #991
Mostly updated the admin interface, also some small other items.
- Added more diagnostic information to (hopefully) decrease issue
reporting, or at least solve them quicker.
- Added an option to generate a support string which can be used to
copy/paste on the forum or during the creation of an issue. It will
try to hide the sensitive information automatically.
- Changed the `Created At` and `Last Active` info to be in a column and
able to sort them in the users overview.
- Some small layout changes.
- Updated javascript and css files to the latest versions available.
- Decreased the png file sizes using `oxipng`
- Updated target='_blank' links to have rel='noreferrer' to prevent
javascript window.opener modifications.
When ticking the 'Also rotate my account's encryption key' box, the key
rotated ciphers are posted after the change of password.
During the password change the security stamp was reseted which made
the posted key's return an invalid auth. This reset is needed to prevent other clients from still being able to read/write.
This fixes this by adding a new database column which stores a stamp exception which includes the allowed route and the current security stamp before it gets reseted.
When the security stamp check fails it will check if there is a stamp exception and tries to match the route and security stamp.
Currently it only allows for one exception. But if needed we could expand it by using a Vec<UserStampException> and change the functions accordingly.
fixes #1240
Prevent clients from updating a cipher if the local copy is stale.
Validation is only performed when the client provides its last known
revision date; this date isn't provided when using older clients,
or when the operation doesn't involve updating an existing cipher.
Upstream PR: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/pull/994
This has been requested a few times (#1136 & #246 & forum), and there already were two
(1:1 duplicate) PR's (#1222 & #1223) which needed some changes and no
followups or further comments unfortunally.
This PR adds two auth headers.
- ManagerHeaders
Checks if the user-type is Manager or higher and if the manager is
part of that collection or not.
- ManagerHeadersLoose
Check if the user-type is Manager or higher, but does not check if the
user is part of the collection, needed for a few features like
retreiving all the users of an org.
I think this is the safest way to implement this instead of having to
check this within every function which needs this manually.
Also some extra checks if a manager has access to all collections or
just a selection.
fixes #1136
If for some reason the hashed password is cleared from memory within a
bitwarden client it will try to verify the password at the server side.
This endpoint was missing.
Resolves #1156
If org owners/admins set their org access to only include selected
collections, then ciphers from non-selected collections shouldn't
appear in "My Vault". This matches the upstream behavior.
Currently, favorites are tracked at the cipher level. For org-owned ciphers,
this means that if one user sets it as a favorite, it automatically becomes a
favorite for all other users that the cipher has been shared with.
* Make `SIGNUPS_DOMAINS_WHITELIST` override the `SIGNUPS_ALLOWED` setting.
Otherwise, a common pitfall is to set `SIGNUPS_DOMAINS_WHITELIST` without
realizing that `SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=false` must also be set.
* Whitespace is now accepted in `SIGNUPS_DOMAINS_WHITELIST`. That is,
`foo.com, bar.com` is now equivalent to `foo.com,bar.com`.
* Add validation on `SIGNUPS_DOMAINS_WHITELIST`. For example, `foo.com,`
is rejected as containing an empty token.
This feature can be enabled by setting SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=false and
providing a comma-separated list of whitelisted domains in
SIGNUPS_DOMAINS_WHITELIST.
Fixes #727
During the 2fa activation there is no twofactor record yet.
Changed the layout a bit so that it will generate a new twofactor record
when it does not exists yet. Else it will just update the already
existing record.
- Added security check for previouse used codes
- Allow TOTP codes with 1 step back and forward when there is a time
drift. This means in total 3 codes could be valid. But only newer codes
then the previouse used codes are excepted after that.
TODO:
- At the moment each user needs to configure a DUO application and input the API keys, we need to check if multiple users can register with the same keys correctly and if so we could implement a global setting.
- Sometimes the Duo frame doesn't load correctly, but canceling, reloading the page and logging in again seems to fix it for me.
