Spiegel von
https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden.git
synchronisiert 2024-11-26 05:50:29 +01:00
Recoded TOTP time drift validation
Dieser Commit ist enthalten in:
Ursprung
d989a19f76
Commit
9466f02696
1 geänderte Dateien mit 24 neuen und 35 gelöschten Zeilen
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@ -118,43 +118,32 @@ pub fn validate_totp_code(user_uuid: &str, totp_code: u64, secret: &str, conn: &
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let current_time: u64 = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
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let current_time: u64 = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
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.expect("Earlier than 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC").as_secs();
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.expect("Earlier than 1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC").as_secs();
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// First check the current time for a valid token.
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// The amount of steps back and forward in time
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let time_step_now = (current_time / 30) as i32;
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let steps = 1;
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let generated_now = totp_raw_custom_time(&decoded_secret, 6, 0, 30, current_time, &HashType::SHA1);
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for step in -steps..=steps {
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if generated_now == totp_code && time_step_now > twofactor.last_used {
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twofactor.last_used = time_step_now;
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twofactor.save(&conn)?;
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return Ok(());
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} else if generated_now == totp_code && time_step_now <= twofactor.last_used {
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warn!("This or a future TOTP code has already been used!");
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err!("Invalid TOTP code!");
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}
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// Check for time drifted codes
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let time_step = (current_time / 30) as i32 + step;
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// First check the previous TOTP code
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// We need to calculate the time offsite and cast it as an i128.
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let time_step_prev = ((current_time - 30) / 30) as i32;
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// Else we can't do math with it on a default u64 variable.
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let generated_prev = totp_raw_custom_time(&decoded_secret, 6, 0, 30, current_time - 30, &HashType::SHA1);
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let time_offset: i128 = (step * 30).into();
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if generated_prev == totp_code && time_step_prev > twofactor.last_used {
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let generated = totp_raw_custom_time(&decoded_secret, 6, 0, 30, (current_time as i128 + time_offset) as u64, &HashType::SHA1);
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info!("TOTP Time drift detected. Token is valide for one step on the past.");
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twofactor.last_used = time_step_prev;
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twofactor.save(&conn)?;
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return Ok(());
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} else if generated_prev == totp_code && time_step_prev <= twofactor.last_used {
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warn!("This or a future TOTP code has already been used!");
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err!("Invalid TOTP code!");
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}
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// Second check the next TOTP code
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// Check the the given code equals the generated and if the time_step is larger then the one last used.
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let time_step_next = ((current_time + 30) / 30) as i32;
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if generated == totp_code && time_step > twofactor.last_used {
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let generated_next = totp_raw_custom_time(&decoded_secret, 6, 0, 30, current_time + 30, &HashType::SHA1);
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if generated_next == totp_code && time_step_next > twofactor.last_used {
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// If the step does not equals 0 the time is drifted either server or client side.
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info!("TOTP Time drift detected. Token is valide for one step on the future.");
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if step != 0 {
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twofactor.last_used = time_step_next;
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info!("TOTP Time drift detected. The step offset is {}", step);
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twofactor.save(&conn)?;
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}
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return Ok(());
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} else if generated_next == totp_code && time_step_next <= twofactor.last_used {
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// Save the last used time step so only totp time steps higher then this one are allowed.
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warn!("This or a previous TOTP code has already been used!");
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twofactor.last_used = time_step;
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err!("Invalid TOTP code!");
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twofactor.save(&conn)?;
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return Ok(());
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} else if generated == totp_code && time_step <= twofactor.last_used {
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warn!("This or a TOTP code within {} steps back and forward has already been used!", steps);
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err!("Invalid TOTP Code!");
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}
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}
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}
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// Else no valide code received, deny access
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// Else no valide code received, deny access
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